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Paul Gewirtzt
Thurgood Marshall's life as a civil rights lawyer inspired my decision to
go to law school, so it was the greatest of dreams fulfilled when I came to
work as his law clerk at the Supreme Court. Now, as he leaves the Court, it
is an honor to mark his retirement in these pages.
Marshall is an extraordinary figure in American legal history. He has lived
many lives-indeed, while others marvel over his professional durability at the
age of eighty-three, I actually think of him as having compressed more than
a hundred years of living into that time span. He was the country's greatest
civil rights lawyer during the greatest period for civil rights advances in our
history, and in that role he lived a life of relentless intensity and danger, and
one of transforming achievement. He was a United States Court of Appeals
Judge. He was Solicitor General of the United States (his favorite job, he has
often said with complete seriousness-an advocate's job in which he spoke for
"the United States," not simply a faction or insurgent part of the whole).
Finally, he became a Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States during
one of its most dramatic periods of change. While he was a top government
official for much of this time-an insider and a colleague of the
advantaged-he spent his entire career trying to protect the disadvantaged and
identifying with them.
The centerpiece of his public life is and always will be Brown v. Board
of Education.1 Marshall did not win Brown alone, and never claimed to have
done so, but he was the guiding force and justly became the symbol of the
triumph. Much has been written about the long litigation campaign leading to
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Brown. But one aspect of
Marshall's achievement is rarely emphasized: to do what he did required an
heroic imagination. He grew up in a ruthlessly discriminatory world-a world
in which segregation of the races was pervasive and taken for granted, where
lynching was common, where the black man's inherent inferiority was pro-
claimed widely and wantonly. Thurgood Marshall had the capacity to imagine
a radically different world, the imaginative capacity to believe that such a world
was possible, the strength to sustain that image in the mind's eye and the
heart's longing, and the courage and ability to make that imagined world real.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Law Clerk to Justice Marshall 1971-72 Term.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The predicate for the great achievement of Brown was to imagine something
better than the present-to resist the acquiescence, passivity, fear, and accom-
modation that overcome so many, to defy an insistent reality with imagination
and then to fight for what was imagined.
Brown changed the world. And because of that, Thurgood Marshall's life
stands for the idea that law can change the world and that the Supreme Court
can be a powerful force in fulfilling our best public values. That was what drew
me to the law, and what has drawn so many others. Brown, then, is not just
a case; its importance cannot be assessed just by totalling up what ending
enforced school segregation may have accomplished. Its importance cannot be
assessed even by recognizing that it gave broad legitimacy to the modern
political struggle for racial equality. Its broadest importance is its embodiment
of a conception of law and of the courts.
The naming of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, therefore, was
an act of the greatest importance. His becoming a part of the Court showed how
much he had changed the world-in many ways it was the most striking
indication of the transformation he had wrought. For all of his imaginative
heroism, it is hard to believe that in the 1930's, '40's and '50's Marshall ever
imagined that he might someday sit on the Court, be more than an insurgent
advocate waiting for others-the Justices-to vindicate him. He created the
world that made his own ultimate personal triumph possible. He would now
share the power to decide. His becoming a Justice became part of what Brown
meant.
The perspective he brought to the Court was unique. The other Justices had
diverse life experiences, and many were major public figures in their own right.
But Marshall brought something distinctive to the Court. The distinctiveness
was not simply that he was the first black to sit on the Court, but that he had
spent much of his professional life working among the oppressed and the
insurgent. To be sure, by the time Marshall came to the Supreme Court he
knew more Presidents and Congressmen than most Justices, and he knew their
needs and their weaknesses; indeed, they were the subject of many of his best
stories. But Marshall also knew the other side of the tracks, not simply as an
observer but as one who had called it home; and he always thought of himself
as an activist on its behalf. He brought to the Court a sense of how the world
worked, and how it worked against those at the bottom. He knew what police
stations were like, what rural Southern life was like, what the New York streets
were like, what trial courts were like, what hard-nosed local political campaigns
were like, what death sentences were like, and what being black in America
was like-and he knew what it felt like to be at risk as a human being. Most
importantly, perhaps, he knew the difference that law could make in all those
places. None of his experiences with the harshness of life made him bitter or
cynical about law's possibilities. He knew well how law could trample individ-
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uals, but he remained faithful to an ideal of what it could do to protect individ-
uals.
Marshall is, as Louis Pollak once called him, "larger-than-life." 2 In his
presence one thinks: This man has genuinely lived. That is partly because of
what one knows of him, partly from the vast and shifting fields of reference
in his fecund supply of stories, and partly from the earned aura given off by
someone who has experienced life especially intensely. For all of that, he is
utterly human. He is earthy, compassionate, determined, funny, and proud. He
does not act like someone taken with his own legend-indeed, at times he
seems to defy people's expectations of who he is. He is outwardly unsentimen-
tal. He never coddled his law clerks, and almost never praised them. Yet he
is in fact a man of strong sentiment and loyalty. The day after I argued my first
Supreme Court case I was back at home in my study reading when the phone
rang. "Paul, it's Thurgood Marshall. I just wanted to tell you that you were
really great yesterday and that I was so proud of you." My fantasies about
arguing before the Court-and there were many-had not included such a
moment. "Now, remember, that doesn't mean you're going to win," he quickly
added, "but I just wanted you to know you did a great job."
He came to the Court during what seemed the heyday of the Warren Court,
but the Court's membership rapidly changed. He wrote many important majority
opinions, but soon found himself a frequent dissenter from a considerable
portion of the Court's work. He found that discouraging, but in some sense it
was his more accustomed position. While he would have devoutly wished to
have ended his career as a comfortable member of the Court's majority, his role
as dissenter was perhaps more authentic for him, or at least more continuous
with what had come before.
For me at least, it is his dissents that sound with the greatest power and
resonance, whether or not one agrees with their ultimate conclusions. I particu-
larly have in mind his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,3 the case that marked the true end of the Warren Court, and perhaps
most especially his dissent in Milliken v. Bradley,4 in which the Court rejected
the appropriateness of most interdistrict relief in school desegregation cases.
The Milliken dissent emerged from the core of Marshall's pre-Court experience
and ended with a sad and angry prophecy:
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task.
Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and adolescence
are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years. But just as the incon-
venience of some cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the rights
of others, so public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be
2. Louis H. Pollak, Thurgood Marshall: Lawyer and Justice, 40 MD. L. REV. 405, 408 (1981).
3. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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permitted to divert this Court from the enforcement of the constitution-
al principles at issue in this case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a
reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough
in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is the
product of neutral principles of law. In the short run, it may seem to
be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided
up each into two cities-one white, the other black-but it is a course,
I predict, our people will ultimately regret. I dissent.'
Justice Marshall's views evolved while he was on the Court. Always a
patriot, he nevertheless became more skeptical of the government's professed
need to promote national interests by restricting individual liberty. He had a
strong distaste for flag burners and others who attacked our country, but he
disciplined that distaste and supported their First Amendment claims, as he
concluded the Constitution required him to do.
Always an egalitarian on racial matters, he broadened his own understand-
ing of the meaning of equality to other social groups. Interestingly, when
affirmative action issues first started to emerge in bold relief, I can recall, he
was very uneasy with race-conscious hiring, admissions, and set-asides as a
corrective for past discrimination. In time, he became their most passionate
defender on the Court. He came to that position, I think, in much the same way
many others did: reluctantly, through a gradually developed judgment that,
against the backdrop of centuries of oppression, colorblind measures would not
work, or at least not work fast enough, to achieve a significantly greater
inclusion of minorities in mainstream American life. Those who have tried to
quote back at the Justice his endorsement of colorblind remedies at the time
of Brown ignore the fact that judges continue to change while in office, and
that the life revealed in cases continues a judge's education.
The departure of Justice Marshall, of course, is not just the end of a great
man's career on the Court, but also the end of a large chapter in the Court's
history, the breaking of the final link to the Warren Court. At the end, Justice
Marshall was an isolated figure on the Court, not only deprived of majorities
in the cases that mattered most to him, but deprived even of the shared memo-
ries and dissenting faith provided by Justice Brennan. For that reason, his
departure produced in many an elegiac mood that Justice Brennan's departure
had not. Linda Greenhouse of The New York Times, writing on a daily deadline,
captured that sense exactly:
Thurgood Marshall ... knows the Court's potential as an instru-
ment for social change better than almost anyone who has ever served
there. Even in advanced age, in evident anger and sorrow, his contin-
ued presence on the bench made him a powerful symbol of the era
when the Court demonstrated that potential to a remarkable degree. His
5. Id. at 814-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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departure crystallizes a moment when a historic tide, long in the
ebbing, has finally run out and a new history of uncertain dimension
has begun to unfold.6
In law, of course, the link to the past is never fully cut because those who
come before always provide some authority for those who come after. History
itself is authority, and history can never be permanently erased. The central
legal strategy leading up to Brown, like the central political strategy of figures
such as Martin Luther King, Jr., was to invoke Americans' historic ideals as
the basis for insisting that America's racial practices had to change. We, after
all, were a country conceived with the proclamation that all men are created
equal, and we have often reproclaimed that faith. Brown did not embody some
radical new principle, but rather was seen as the fulfillment of promises made
a century or two earlier in the Declaration of Independence, in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and in cases like Strauder v. West Virginia,7 whose sweeping
rationale had been ignored in subsequent decisions. The appeal in Brown was
not to ideas outside the central American tradition, but to the core of that
intellectual tradition itself. That is why Thurgood Marshall's intuitively patriotic
response to flag burning or Communists should never have surprised me: the
premise of the great litigation campaign leading up to Brown was that what
blacks had to work with, their best hope, was America's own ideals, the
symbols of its democratic faith.
The Justice's dissents of the past two decades, progressively harsher and
more numerous, also appealed to the country's historic ideals. But they were
also appeals to the future-at least implicitly a beacon to some later day when
the Court might change and perhaps follow the alternative path laid out by
today's dissent.
As the new Court consolidates its membership and direction, the great
historic question is this: A hundred years from now, will the Warren Court be
seen as a parenthesis in the history of the Court-an essentially aberrant
deflection from the true path of the Court's development? Or will the newly
emergent late twentieth century Court itself be seen as the parenthesis, the
aberrant deflection? There is, of course, no way to know; "[t]here is no pulling
open the buds to see what the blossom will be."8 There may, in fact, be no
ultimate answer. But if the Warren Court is the parenthesis, Marshall's dissents
will be ignored; if the Rehnquist Court proves to be the aberration, then
Marshall's dissents will be rediscovered and will provide authority and guidance
for the future. Dissenters (whether the Marshalls or the Scalias) hope to become
like Holmes and Brandeis-prophets vindicated by the future, dissenters who
6. Linda Greenhouse, The Conservative Majority Solidifies, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, § 4, at 1.
7. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
8. D.H. LAWRENcE, Democracy, in PHOENIX: THE POSTHUMOUS PAPERS OF D.H. LAWRENCE 699,715
(Edward D. McDonald ed., 1936).
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became great prophets because (indeed, only because) they were vindicated by
history.
If we can predict anything about our constitutional future, though, we know
that Thurgood Marshall is indelibly impressed upon it. Perhaps more clearly
than any other recent member of the Court, he is an historic figure. He funda-
mentally changed our world for the better, which can be said of very very few
lawyers. And he deservedly has become a symbol of America's possi-
bilities-the possibility that we can redeem our terrible racial past, that our
constitutional ideals are part of our strength as a nation, and that a life in the
law can be a life of the largest purpose and achievement.
HeinOnline -- 101 Yale L.J. 18 1991-1992
